economists lacking a pragmatic bent, made possible the attainment of a 3.5 percent growth rate in the third quarter, according to advance estimates. The far grimmer scenario of a financial and economic freefall was conceivable when the recession began, especially for those who recognized the many parallels between the events of 2007-08 and the onset of the Great Depression in 1929. In short, policymakers recognized the threat of a depression, and adopted the "big government" policies that are necessary in that situation. Our late colleague Hyman P. Minsky wrote about the inevitability of such government responses in times of severe financial turmoil, and argued that they stabilized the economy, but always came at a price and never brought true full employment (Minsky 2008 (Minsky [1986 ).
The nascent recovery is still very fragile, and one cannot be very optimistic when the official measure of unemployment is at 10.2 percent. Moreover, good policy-making strategy will require a clear-eyed assessment of the prospects of the economy over the medium term. Discussions of these prospects already abound in the public discourse. Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben S. Bernanke has continued to emphasize the importance of reducing imbalances even following his reluctant acceptance of near-zero interest rates. "As the global economy recovers and trade volumes rebound," he worries, "global imbalances may reassert themselves" (Bernanke 2009 ).
Bernanke believes that the key to reducing imbalances is to tighten fiscal policy as soon as possible without jeopardizing the recovery. How much stimulus has been applied so far?
A look at the rate at which the government and the Fed have been generating financial liabilities (promises to pay) might help us answer this question. Both of these important policymaking institutions issue liabilities that affect the economy: in the case of the Fed, these liabilities are mostly currency and the reserve deposits of commercial banks; the federal government, meanwhile, issues Treasury bills, notes, bonds, and some other liabilities, which enable it to borrow money from investors. Both kinds of liabilities allow the government to spend in excess of its revenues, so they reflect the fiscal policies of the past. However, in many cases, the Fed "sells" liabil- During the last two quarters for which data are available, the Fed actually reduced its liabilities, but this reduction was more than offset by rising federal government debt. On the other hand, the figure provides the somewhat reassuring information that, while public liabilities were much lower in 2007 than they are now, they were also at levels that some .7
Total Also, the financial sector enjoyed a long period of relative calm in the two decades that followed the war, partly because bank portfolios-heavy in Treasury securities, government insured fixed-rate mortgages, and other safe investmentsheld their value well (Minsky 2008 (Minsky [1986 . This point about the benefits of an abundant supply of securities with minuscule default risks helps justify a continuation of stimulative policy until the economy is on a firmer footing.
While we believe Bernanke has overemphasized government deficits, our approach to macroeconomics gives a lead-
The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 3 ing role to all of the key financial balances-the private sector deficit, the government deficit, and the current account deficit-and we agree that it is important to keep them at sus- In this strategic analysis, we first take a long view. We review how some important economic variables, including the three main sector balances, have evolved over the past 30 years.
Then, making use of the Levy Institute macro model, we project how some of these variables would change in the medium term in three hypothetical scenarios: a baseline scenario predicated on middle-of-the-road projections of fiscal policy and future exchange rates; scenario 1, which assumes that fiscal policy follows a more stimulative path; and scenario 2, which assumes an 11.9 percent devaluation of the dollar from its third quarter average and a fiscal policy stance that falls somewhere between the two posited in the other scenarios. Finally, in our concluding section, we offer some policy suggestions, based on our Keynesian perspective and the somewhat encouraging results from the last scenario.
The Nascent Recovery in Historical Perspective
Perhaps the most dramatic sign of the recession's severity is the state of the labor market. Labor market indicators point to conditions that the United States has not seen in a long time.
From 1980 until the early 2000s, the labor force participation The growth rate of real (inflation-adjusted) wages is shown in Figure 2d . That rate is negative, despite the fact that inflation has been kept in check by excess manufacturing capacity, weak consumer demand, and low oil prices. Recently, even rising productivity has not translated into real wage growth, but profits have risen in the first two quarters of this year. All of these labor-market statistics add up to a picture of hardship for many Americans and to weak consumer demand, which will make recovery more difficult. Reduced earnings have especially grave implications right now, when many consumers are burdened with excessive debt. 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 The observation of exchange rate pass-through has implications for our understanding of the effects of exchange-rate changes on the current account deficit. Economists view a devaluation of the dollar as one of the main tools available to reduce the trade deficit. However, the "terms-of-trade effect" limits the effectiveness of this policy instrument, since Americans spend more money on imported goods and services as their prices rise-unless they buy less of these foreign commodities.
This perverse relationship between the terms of trade, exports, and imports was exemplified by the case of oil imports during most of the current decade, as shown in For this and other reasons, large international imbalances call for policy responses that extend beyond exchange-rate adjustments, including measures to reduce demand for some imported goods. These policies could, for example, respond to the urgent need to reduce dependence on fossil fuels, which is resistant to exchange-rate adjustment. We would support a massive investment in clean energy and energy conservation that would create "green jobs" and help forestall global climate change. We discuss policy options further in the concluding section of this strategic analysis.
Baseline Scenario
The economy's state in 2009, as described above, has evolved along the lines we outlined in our previous strategic analysis (Godley, Papadimitriou, and Zezza 2008) loss in output generated by the current recession will not be made up through faster growth.
We assume that the price of oil and prices in U.S. trading partners will both grow at around 2 percent, and that the U.S.
dollar exchange rate will stabilize at the current (third quarter, 2009) level. We next assume that confidence will gradually return to financial markets, so that borrowing by both households and businesses starts to revert, very gradually, toward its long-term average (Figure 15 ). We posit that net household borrowing will stay negative, but fall as a percentage of GDP, until 2013; our new assumptions on borrowing are therefore more optimistic than those we adopted in our last strategic analysis.
Finally, in our baseline scenario we verify the consequences of the end of the fiscal stimulus, using projections from the latest Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report 1970 1975 1985 1980 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 We emphasize that our scenarios are conditional projections, not forecasts: they are meant to show what is likely to happen over a horizon of about six years if certain assumptions turn out to be true. Our medium-term approach means that we do not focus on making precise statements about the outlook for the next six months.
All of our assumptions, taken together, imply that real GDP growth will resume but remain sluggish throughout our simulation period, staying well below the rate required to reduce unemployment, which will hover around 10 percent through the end of the simulation period in 2015 (Figure 17 ).
Under this scenario, all financial imbalances will converge toward zero (Figure 18 ). The general government deficit will peak at nearly 11.3 percent of GDP in the fourth quarter of this year (somewhat above our assumption of an 11.2 percent deficit for the entire fiscal year that ended in September) and then drop below 4 percent at the end of the simulation period, which is in the first quarter of fiscal year 2016. Our assumed gradual increase in private sector borrowing, along with income growth, will lower the private sector surplus toward its prebubble historical norm. Finally, slow growth will help shrink the current account deficit to less than 1 percent of GDP by the end of the simulation period.
Household debt outstanding will drop considerably, from 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 sector will stabilize at around 73 percent of GDP. However, sustained government deficits will increase the stock of government debt 4 from the current 61 percent of GDP to 91 percent of GDP by the end of the simulation period. These projections of debt outstanding may appear to be quite high, but they will be sustainable provided that interest rates are kept at their current historically low level, as we assume in our baseline scenario.
It is clear from our analysis that the fiscal stimulus has provided strong support to aggregate demand, preventing further damage, but it has not been sufficient to lower unemployment. With private sector demand slowly coming backowing to improvements in the stock market and the stabilization of the housing market and credit conditionsthe end of the fiscal stimulus will nevertheless leave the economy in a "growth recession."
The results from our baseline simulation may seem pessimistic, given that growth could resume at a faster pace in the economies of U.S. trading partners. In particular, some analysts claim that emerging economies, notably India and China, are "decoupling" from the world recession by applying fiscal stimuli aimed at strengthening domestic demand. If sustained, such policies will have a positive effect on U.S. exports, but it may be smaller than one would hope. A dollar devaluation will raise the cost of oil imports, but it will be effective in increasing net exports, with an impact on aggregate demand that would permit a tighter fiscal policy than in our previous scenario. Therefore, we also assume that the government deficit is slowly reduced relative to its level in our previous scenario (but not as much as in the baseline scenario).
Under these hypotheses, unemployment falls in line with our previous fiscal policy experiment, dropping below 7.5 percent at the end of the simulation period ( Figure 17 ). As 
Conclusion
We are aware that a further, orderly devaluation of the U.S. However, a significant devaluation alone would not significantly and quickly reduce oil imports. In scenario 2, oil imports are about one third greater than the entire U.S. current account deficit by the end of the simulation period. Oil imports do not change much in this scenario because of the weakness we have described in the response of this variable to changes in the nominal exchange rate.
An international pact could help reduce fossil-fuel consumption in the United States and abroad, but it now appears that the global climate summit in Copenhagen (December 6-18) is unlikely to produce a strong agreement on carbon emissions. Global imbalances give us another important reason to support current national efforts to develop alternative energy sources such as solar power, and to urge the expansion of these initiatives.
Our policy conclusions can then be summarized in five points:
1) If stimulative policies are adopted, the current account deficit will likely begin growing again over the medium term, as the economy strengthens, unless countervailing measures are adopted. This threat calls for stronger efforts to devalue the U.S. dollar, especially against undervalued Asian currencies.
2) Scenario 2 demonstrates that high levels of government borrowing (above 5 percent of GDP through 2015) will be sustainable, and need not jeopardize current account rebalancing over the medium term, provided that the dollar depreciates and interest rates remain low.
3) Unemployment will be the key economic problem for at least several years, as it is the most important social cost of recessions and will remain very high without strongly stimulative fiscal policy.
4) The government should devote more effort and money to developing alternative energy sources and encouraging energy conservation, as a devaluation alone would not have a large impact on oil imports. Such initiatives dovetail with other efforts to improve air quality and slow global climate change.
5) President Obama's recent public disagreement with
President Hu Jintao of China over a possible revaluation of the renminbi underscores the challenge of a multilateral approach to currency adjustments and shows that much work remains to be done at an international level to achieve sustainable growth. 3. The methodology behind our index is described in Shaikh, Zezza, and Dos Santos (2003a, 2003b) . 4. We model government debt as the cumulated sum of government deficits.
Appendix
The national accounting identity is a relationship among the three main sector balances:
Private Sector Deficit + Government Deficit + Current Account Balance = 0 (1)
The derivation builds on two well-known key identities. One identity shows the demand components of GDP:
GDP = Private expenditure (PE) + Government Expenditure (GE) + Net exports (NE) (2)
where private expenditure is the sum of consumption and gross investment, including the change in inventories. From the income side, we have
GDP = National income (Y) -Net income from abroad (NYFA) (3)
Equating the right-hand side of equations (2) and (3), and using symbols, we have
Y -NYFA = PE + GE + NE (4)
Disposable income of the private sector is given by national income, less any net payments from the private sector to the government (TG), plus any net payments from the foreign sector to the private sector (TW) that are not already measured in national income. Using YD for the disposable income of the private sector, we have
YD = Y -TG + TW (5)
using equation (5) in (4) we get
YD + TG -TW -NYFA = PE + GE + NE (6)
and rearranging
(PE -YD) + (GE -TG) + (NE + TW + NYFA) = 0 (7)
Adding and subtracting net payments from the government to the foreign sector, GW, we get
(PE -YD) + (GE -TG + GW) + (NE + TW + NYFA -GW) = 0 (8)
The first 
